Intersectional Anti-Imperialism
Intersectional Anti-imperialism:
A Feminist Response to War and State Repression
The Iran Circle | Speaker: Dr. Manijeh Moradian | Host: Amin Feizpour
Dr. Manijeh Moradian, a scholar of gender studies and author of This Flame Within: Iranian Revolutionaries in the United States, spoke at a recent Iran Circle session about the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising, the failure of solidarity from much of the Western left, and the possibility of an "intersectional anti-imperialism." What follows is an edited written report of her talk and the question-and-answer session. It stays close to the speaker's vocabulary and reasoning, but repetitions and asides have been trimmed and the material reorganized. (A fuller, near word-for-word bilingual transcript is available separately.)
1. Context: a world stuck in an impasse
Moradian built her talk on her article "Feminist Uprising in Iran and the Politics of Solidarity" (Meridians), written in spring and summer 2024 and still, she said, "imbued with the affects of the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising and its potential." Much has happened since: two wars against Iran, one of which is "still going on in its strange way"; intensified economic collapse that led to the Dey uprising; a state massacre of protesters unprecedented in Iranian history for its brutality; hundreds of executions; and harsher sanctions. The result is intense fracture and polarization among Iranians inside Iran, in the diaspora, and even on the left. One example is the wave of accusations that followed the Guardian letter of solidarity with Iranian political prisoners in August, which some leftists, Iranian and non-Iranian, attacked as aiding imperialism.
She placed this in a wider frame. The global left has felt politically stuck for generations: official communism was defeated and discredited at the end of the Cold War, and Thatcher declared that capitalism had won and "there is no alternative." The promises of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movements were broken by the repressive states that arose in their wake, while the militarism and outright genocide of imperial powers have made life increasingly unlivable for large parts of the world. We are, she said, stuck between imperial states and so-called anti-imperialist states that inflict different forms of repression and violence, often on the same populations. In Iran, ordinary people have tried again and again to change their society from within, whether through reform or through demands for the end of the regime, and have been met with state violence. US-Israeli bombing and sanctions have made conditions even more unbearable and handed the Iranian state "the best excuse in the world", wartime national security, to intensify repression.
In this demoralizing moment, she insists, the Women, Life, Freedom movement must not be allowed to fade as an ephemeral event buried under rubble. We should think with the possibilities it opened: the alternative social relations and vision for transforming Iranian society, and perhaps the world, that it enacted through protest, debate, civil disobedience, strikes, cultural production, and the global reach of social media.
2. Women, Life, Freedom: a feminist, anti-colonial uprising
Moradian argues that the movement was a historic event and a revolutionary feminist uprising that moved the question of women's status from the margins to the center of the widespread aspiration to end the authoritarian order. In 1979 women's rights had been sidelined, as the subordination of women to the anti-colonial struggle happened in nearly every decolonization movement in what was once called the third world. The state killing of Jina Amini triggered something genuinely new: a mass uprising rooted in the embodied knowledge and lived experience of post-colonial state domination over women's bodies as a core pillar of the whole repressive apparatus. People understood that the oppression of women was a pillar propping up that apparatus, not something secondary that could be deferred.
Unlike liberal or bourgeois feminisms, the movement did not seek only to change particular laws, such as mandatory hijab or gender segregation, or only rights within a fundamentally oppressive structure. It sought to break down relations of domination at every level: home, school, workplace, street, state. Quoting her article, she called it "a revolutionary breakthrough, resolving what had been a conceptual and political problem since 1979": the rejection of the binary opposition between national sovereignty and bodily autonomy that had structured the ruling ideology for over four decades and marginalized compulsory hijab even within pro-democracy movements. A feminist stance against all forms of domination was therefore open to people of all genders and walks of life: men joined, queer and trans freedom entered the protest lexicon, and millions saw in a women-led movement a vision of radical egalitarianism.
The uprising also challenged the nation-state as the horizon and ultimate goal of liberation, rejecting colonial logics as well as the masculinist, militarized logics of anti-colonial nationalism. She quoted the poet and scholar Fatemeh Shams: "The true spirit of this revolutionary movement is its non-binary logic. It breaks away from all of the binary logics, including East versus West. This is by default and in its true sense an anti-colonial movement. And I think that aspect has to be recognized not just by us, but also by the world."
Third-world feminism and the history behind it
To make sense of this claim, she said, we must return to the era of decolonization (late 1940s to 1970s) and the project of third-world feminism, which emerged country after country in response to the ways newly independent states relegated women to second-class citizenship. All nation-states operate through ideologies of gender and sexuality; in the Global South women are positioned as bearers of the authentic culture that must be reasserted after Western colonial violence, and their bodies and sexuality are regulated in the service of the national project. This, she stressed, is not specific to Iran or to Islam: Christian and communist countries have done the same, mobilizing ideas of gender difference as natural and biological to legitimize nationalism. Third-world feminists argued that decolonization did not end with the post-colonial state, both because of neo-colonial economic relations and because of domestic regimes of patriarchal authoritarianism resting on logics, and sometimes institutions and laws, inherited from the colonial era.
Iran was never a direct colony, yet the modern centralized Iranian state, inherited and adapted by the Islamists, was formed in reaction to European incursions into the economy (tobacco, oil) around 1900, which brought down the Qajars, led to the Constitutional Revolution and the rise of the Pahlavis, and their project of building a centralized modern nation-state with all the violence that entailed. The Iranian elite's mode of anti-colonialism was to prove to the West that Iran was as enlightened, modern, and powerful as any Western country. By 1978, when the Shah's corruption, inequality, and repression had alienated vast sectors of society, the question of what kind of state would replace this pro-Western neo-colonial entity was not a foregone conclusion, and the consolidation of the Islamic Republic was contested at many levels.
In her book she situates the March 1979 women's uprising in Tehran within a longer genealogy of third-world (or post-colonial) feminism. The women who protested publicly for nearly a week, beginning on International Women's Day, challenged both patriarchal authoritarianism and Western imperialism, insisting the revolution was meant to be about freedom for everyone. But for the men in power or vying for it, and for revolutionaries who held a hierarchical idea of struggle that put anti-imperialism above the so-called "woman question," the revolution was only about overthrowing the Shah and establishing a sovereign state. Everything else was secondary, a distraction, or a site of weakness imperialists could exploit. Women who did not sign on were suspect: potential third columns, accused of being bourgeois and counter-revolutionary.
In many ways, Women, Life, Freedom continued the process interrupted in 1979, insisting that patriarchal authoritarianism is not the necessary price of national sovereignty and had in fact distorted the dream of sovereignty itself. In 2022 there were no calls for foreign intervention from the movement on the ground; instead, a reaffirmation of popular collective solidarity as the force that could remake society, a new feminist iteration of self-determination. Within it, she saw a willingness to confront Persian supremacy: the Kurdish movement where it began, the Baluch movement and other marginalized populations asserting demands for freedom, autonomy, and equality; women who wear hijab as an expression of faith marching against compulsory hijab alongside unveiled women; rainbow flags and graffiti supporting queer and trans rights. It could not be reduced to West versus East, or to some rigid notion of authentic Muslim culture against corrupting foreign influence.
3. The silence of the Western left
In the West this uprising should have inspired solidarity, especially among feminists who have spent great energy fighting Islamophobia and the war on terror and arguing that Muslim women do not need saving by Western powers. Instead it proved "tragically difficult" to mobilize any vocal, visible support. Support that did come, in her research, was led and organized by Iranians, who had to go to great lengths to assure people that the movement was neither pro-US nor Islamophobic.
In her first book she wrote about "affects of solidarity": the visceral attachment Iranians in the 1960s and 70s felt toward others' liberation movements, from Palestinians to Black Americans, because they wanted to fight US backing of the Shah in the same way. That affective resonance across vast differences let people on the receiving end of US imperialism, in very different ways, identify with one another. The same affects now circulate around many liberation movements, but they did not circulate between US-based activists and the Women, Life, Freedom movement.
Her answer is simple: activists and scholars committed to opposing US imperialism are deeply worried about feeding the demonization of Iran and thereby justifying US intervention. As she wrote, after decades of feminist scholarship criticizing the Western fixation on the veil, and showing that hijab can be empowering for some Muslim women, it proved disorienting for many US-based anti-colonial feminists to respond to Muslim women burning their hijabs because they see them as part of their oppression. Instead of the core feminist principle of centering the lived experience of those most affected, there was hesitancy and silence, as if what was happening in Iran were incomprehensible or impermissible, "dangerously unaligned" and untamable in the usual geopolitical and leftist categories, which ask us to begin with a movement's relationship to US imperialism rather than to the society in which it takes place. This US-centric view of anti-imperialism, she argues, has led to silence, hesitancy, and in some cases direct complicity.
Some in the West even defend the Islamic Republic as anti-imperialist and so an ally of anti-imperialist movements, a position sometimes called neo-campism, a new iteration of the Cold War division of the world into two camps that led leftists to defend the Soviet camp whatever repression it inflicted in the name of state communism. As anti-communism gave way to the anti-Muslim politics of the War on Terror, many anti-war activists reproduced the binary logic in a new guise: support any state that challenges US power. The fight against US imperialism then takes precedence over everything else, including the executions of hundreds of prisoners. People who oppose the death penalty everywhere else cannot figure out how to speak about it, assured that "yes, there's repression in Iran, all states repress, but that's not as important as Iran standing up to US and Israeli aggression." This hit a low point in August, with the Guardian letter controversy, when progressive activists said the killed protesters were foreign agents, and anyone resisting the Islamic Republic was suspected of being a Zionist or US agent and so somehow deserving of it. A left that opposes mass incarceration and uses the language of abolitionism let those principles lapse where Iran was concerned.
A disastrous consequence: the right-wing takeover
One of the most disastrous effects of these failures has been to cede the terrain of human rights and women's rights in Iran, first to liberals, the Democratic Party, and NGOs such as the UN, Amnesty, and Human Rights Watch, and more recently to monarchists and those openly calling for war. She stressed this takeover is relatively recent, not complete, monolithic, or entirely successful, with many cracks and pushback; but it has been successful up to a point, partly because of the money and media access of those forces, with their satellite channels. Yet people also watched Iran International and Manoto for a long time, and these gained traction and a new affective power because Iranians feel so demoralized, traumatized, and abandoned: there was no visible solidarity with, or recognition of, Woman, Life, Freedom and its repression from the international or Western left. There were exceptions, like the Zapatistas and their statement, but they were few and far between. This "deafening silence" has given the left a bad name among many Iranians, as nothing more than apologists for the Islamic Republic. How do we chart a way out of a nightmare that has paved the way for monarchist capture on one side and cultural relativism, neo-campism, and hesitancy on the other?
4. Learning from the feminists who came before: the lineage of intersectionality
Her answer: learn from the women revolutionaries and feminists before us, Iranian women, third-world and Global South women, and racialized women in the Global North. "We do not need to reinvent the wheel." There is nothing new about women confronting more than one source of oppression at once, external and internal to their communities: targeted by foreign militaries and by domestic police; by racist, orientalist, or anti-Muslim ideas and policies from the West and by rigid patriarchal ideas about religion and culture imposed from within. Her studies of the US third-world left and of anti-colonial movements in West Asia and North Africa show women taking part in mass movements against racism, war, and colonization, and, out of that lived experience, being pushed to articulate a revolutionary feminist politics challenging the patriarchal ideas embedded in the very movements they had joined, ideas which they experienced firsthand as stunting their ability to fight for freedom for themselves and for everyone.
In the US this is a lineage, "a citational story that we need to tell again and again": from the Third World Women's Alliance to the Combahee River Collective, and the writings of Angela Davis, Audre Lorde, Gloria Anzaldúa, and Cherríe Moraga, who, she noted, signed the letter of solidarity with political prisoners in Iran and was attacked for it. These thinkers refused to prioritize the national struggle, say of Black people against racism, over the need to eradicate patriarchal violence against racialized women. They understood that the US state was against all Black people, but that there would be no real freedom as long as Black male assertions of dignity reproduced patriarchal oppression of Black women. They gave us a language for overlapping, interlocking oppressions, what Patricia Hill Collins and Kimberlé Crenshaw would later call intersectionality.
She distinguished two versions. One is a liberal, legalistic version based on individual identity, asking how individuals with more than one oppressed identity are legible within laws and institutions that see only one axis, race or gender but not both (Crenshaw's formulation); this is what critical race theory addresses, and is perhaps the more mainstream version. The other is a more radical genealogy that came out of revolutionary movements led by women who believed the revolution must end all forms of oppression, and that it was impossible to rank racism over sexism, or imperialism over class and patriarchal exploitation, or to engage in "lesser evilism" and hierarchical thinking without replacing popular self-determination with the will of men over women or of the state over society. This genealogy focuses on structural oppressions that overlap or interlock, not on identity or the individual. The Third World Women's Alliance newspaper was called Triple Jeopardy (racism, imperialism, sexism), and its first issue declared: "The struggle against racism and imperialism must be waged simultaneously with the struggle for women's liberation."
Colonialism and imperialism, she added, work through particular ideas about gender and sexuality; these are not ancillary but fundamental. Triple Jeopardy is one of countless examples, many from anti-colonial revolutions from India to Algeria to Iran; she is currently teaching Marnia Lazreg's The Eloquence of Silence, about Algerian women in the decolonization movement. Because this generation of feminists was deeply internationalist, they perceived profound resonances between their struggles despite the differences between their conditions (Black women in the US, women in Algeria or Vietnam). The differences mattered but were not reified, and did not prevent them from identifying with and learning from each other's struggles for a better world.
5. "Intersectional anti-imperialism"
In her book Moradian offers the concept of an intersectional anti-imperialism to counter the arguments of male leftists and nationalists who slandered Iranian women as counter-revolutionary when they rose against discriminatory laws in March 1979. Those women, she argues, were not pro-Pahlavi or pro-imperialist; their vision of a free Iran was made illegible by the binary of imperialism versus anti-imperialism and the hierarchical model of liberation in which imperialism is the "primary contradiction." We hear the same today: Iran fighting the US and Israel is the primary thing and everything else is secondary. "Before it was 'after the Shah'; now it's 'after the war.' I don't know when the 'after' can happen. When are we allowed to debate these other issues?" Even for Marxists then, women's liberation was deferred until after the socialist revolution, and would wither away as a side effect of ending class exploitation, requiring no conscious or specific struggle.
What she sees today is a deep failure of anti-imperialist leftists to take seriously, or learn from, third-world feminism, an intellectual lineage that largely has not been learned from by the Western left. The Iranian women of March 1979 wanted neither a pro-Western dictatorship nor an Islamist state, as the chants show (which she analyzes in her book): "Freedom is neither Eastern nor Western, it is universal." "We did not make a revolution to go backwards." "Death or freedom." They lived, struggled, and sacrificed at the intersection of two distinct forms of patriarchal authoritarianism: the pro-Western Shah and the Islamist factions behind Khomeini. To be equal agents of history and of their own futures they had to confront the intersection of imperial domination and domestic dictatorship; they came into the streets to claim the revolution they had helped make, so that it would not betray them. They rose against intersecting structures of foreign and domestic repression, which is why she calls it an intersectional anti-imperialism.
She hopes the concept, by naming these problems and an alternative, can offer a counter to masculinist, state-centered anti-imperialism, whether "we must prioritize fighting US imperialism" or "the Islamic Republic is anti-imperialist, so we must defend it." Intersectional anti-imperialism insists that all systems of domination shored up by foreign intervention and colonial logics be dismantled, not refashioned in the name of the authentic national religion or culture. It extends and deepens decolonization: not a one-time replacement of one state with another, but a bottom-up, grassroots process at every level, from home to street to school to workplace to state laws and institutions. Women, Life, Freedom was a new generation's iteration of this unfinished freedom struggle, emerging after decades of lived post-colonial sovereignty and imperial punishment.
Without such an orientation, the suffering and resistance of ordinary Iranians, from the streets to the prisons, workplaces, and campuses, can be co-opted by monarchist, pro-war forces or cast as a threat to national security. Political prisoners become collateral damage of a strong anti-imperialist state, and many well-meaning people abroad who care about social justice will simply look away because they cannot deal with the contradictions of a state that fights the US and Israel while remaining the major obstacle to its own people's freedom.
6. Conclusion
As Iranian women and other colonized and racialized women before us have shown, the starting point has to be how structural oppression is lived: how it touches down on bodies and in lives. From that vantage point the nuances, collusions, and contradictions of intersecting structural forces of violence and repression can be understood, theorized, and opposed. Methodologically and politically, she believes this enables ethical consistency and transnational solidarity without collapsing or ignoring differences. Her closing lines: "Solidarity is never about identity or sameness. It is always a relation across difference. And the starting point is more often than not a feeling of attachment to the freedom dreams of others."
7. Question and answer
7.1 Amin Feizpour's question: caught between two poles
After thanking her, Amin described his and his friends' experience in Boston: Iranian rallies in front of the UN against Raisi, where people from the Mojahedin to Pahlavi supporters to those aligned with neither spoke with one voice; then, within a few months, as he put it, the movement collapsed as many were drawn, under the influence of media tied to governments such as Israel's, toward imperialist policies, while Western leftists withheld support, citing Islamophobia. He recounted attending a Mass Peace Action anti-war rally in Boston whose flyers showed no sign of the Islamic Republic, but where the Islamic Republic's flag was displayed as a central symbol, and where people carrying a "No to the Islamic Republic and no to war" sign were asked to take it down. He also noted positive signs, such as links some see between the "No Kings" movement and Woman, Life, Freedom.
His question: we in America are being crushed between two heavy currents, the far right (Trump, Netanyahu) and pro-war forces on one side, and on the other so-called anti-imperialist groups who recognize no agency for the people and women of Iran and end up supporting the Islamic Republic, what Dr. Maljoo has called the "resistance-axis left," as opposed to the "people-centric left," and what Moradian calls the "state-centered left." How can those who see themselves as a "third voice," saying no both to domestic repression and to war and foreign aggression, turn from a small minority into an influential majority? How can the "absolutist left" be persuaded that its absolute, one-sided anti-colonialism has blinded it, and how can supporters of war (Pahlavi, Netanyahu, Trump supporters) be made to see that they are not serving Iranians' interests? Both, he said, share an identification with some form of patriarchy.
7.2 Moradian's answer: building on solidarity
Moradian said it is a very hard question with no easy solution, but what gives her hope is that she thinks neither side, pro-war or pro-Islamic Republic, accurately explains the world. The initial "surge of wild hope" that the US and Israel might dislodge the Islamic Republic and something good come of war has, she said, "crashed and burned"; though she disliked the glib, dismissive attitude of some leftists toward that hope, and she understands the affective structure of someone who feels their future is foreclosed, even while disagreeing with its politics. Her own focus is not on monarchists or pro-war people but on the left, anti-war activists and feminists: how to rebuild internationalism and forms of solidarity that do not collapse into support for repressive states just because they oppose US and Israeli hegemony.
She criticized the widespread view that because the US is bombing and sanctioning Iran, our only job in the US is to criticize our government and leave the rest to Iranians. Pressuring the US government is necessary but not enough, and it is not how people treat other liberation movements: on Palestine, people do not only say "stop arming Israel"; they speak of solidarity with Palestine as a movement for human liberation against fascism and colonialism. How do we make Iran legible in that way? Like Black Lives Matter, Woman, Life Freedom should have resonated globally as a historic breakthrough, a mass feminist uprising that was not pro-Western but rooted in lived experience and self-determination. That it did not is "very painful."
She recalled 2009, when she and others formed the Raha Iranian Feminist Collective because they were dissatisfied with the discourse: they did not want monarchists and Mojahedin dominating the protests, nor orientalist scripts about Iranians. They marched with a sign along the lines of "Hillary Clinton, who's going to liberate you?"; "liberation comes from below" was their main banner, opposing imperialist feminists and the monarchy. What is different now is that we are not in a reformist moment but in a moment of mass alienation from the regime inside the country, and that many people on the call, Iranians who grew up in Iran, understand its complexity and can represent themselves. Restoring belief that people really can liberate themselves matters; after the Dey massacre there was a collective despair of "we can't do it." She understands it, but "people don't stay in that place," and you cannot make politics from the darkest moment of defeat. The return of struggle and protest inside Iran is already visible, and the only answer she has is to hold ourselves accountable to those struggles and keep doing the work. Amin added, citing Dr. Madani's letter to Dr. Asef Bayat, that "we don't need hope of getting there; we need the courage to continue fighting."
7.3 Ali Barootian's question: does your own framework face a problem?
Ali Barootian, who had read the article and valued its critique of Western academia, asked whether the same problem does not also exist in Moradian's own framework. He said the article mostly reads support for Pahlavi in connection with US and Israeli foreign policy and an effort to impose a return to monarchy; but if part of the people inside Iran, with their own independent political agency, truly want Pahlavi's return or accept him as leader of a transition to democracy, how is that formulated within her framework? Is it not itself a kind of reductionism, he asked, when US critical and anti-imperialist frameworks hold even many Iranian professors, long distant from the experience of Iranian society, captive? He added that professors and students live in fear in the humanities, because anything against the mainstream means marginalization and lost opportunities, so that even for publishing or defending a thesis they must fit this framework; yet independent academics inside Iran do not see the issue as left versus right and see no contradiction between accepting Pahlavi's leadership, seeking a transition, or even seeking foreign intervention, and anti-imperialist or anti-colonial concerns.
7.4 Moradian's answer: every framework carries risks
Moradian agreed any theoretical framework carries risks and said she does not claim to have solved the problem. She tries to hold two things together: the need to resist foreign domination, since imperialism is not over (the US and Israel and, differently, China and Russia play a destructive role in West Asia, propping up repressive governments, so a regional vision of liberation cannot ignore dislodging US support for them, Arab and Israeli alike); and the need to free anti-imperialism from its patriarchal, nationalist, state-centered form, which she says has betrayed women country after country, failed to end class inequality, and reproduced ethno-nationalism. Whether a state can be non-patriarchal, non-ethno-nationalist, and non-capitalist is a bigger question. Her contribution is to re-imagine anti-imperialist politics through a feminist decolonial framework, which she finds most enabling for an alternative worldview.
She sees Women, Life, Freedom as "a kind of world-making project": it did not succeed in toppling the state or changing any law, but it reoriented people to think anew about how we relate to each other, how we move in public space, and how we might live differently if women's subordination to men were not the organizing principle of society. On monarchism, "starting from lived experience" means understanding the historical process that produced its support, which is neither steady nor consistent; a few years ago there was little support for monarchism inside Iran even among critics. She does not believe a Pahlavi restoration would make Iranians freer; she expects it to reproduce exploitation, inequality, and patriarchy, and sees in it nothing of the alternative social and economic relations Iranians have been fighting for.
On "what do we do when people are being massacred?", she cautioned that the massacre came first and the war weeks later; if US military intervention could stop state repression and improve lives, it would be a real debate, but there is no empirical evidence for that, and cases like Afghanistan and Iraq show the opposite. We should ask where such feelings come from, whether there is a kind of Iranian exceptionalism, and "historicize it and explain it, but not be dismissive of it", especially with people inside Iran: what is the hope, and is it a narrowing of the political imagination that was widespread a few years ago? That is why she keeps returning to moments of possibility, whether five or six days in March 1979 or the months when Women, Life, Freedom was ascendant, and theorizing from them rather than only from defeat and despair.
7.5 A guest's question and the answer
A guest (in English) asked whether it is not a colonialist approach for someone who has never lived in Iran or suffered its realities to prescribe what is good or bad for ordinary Iranians; Iranians have agency, one or two TV channels cannot change a society's mindset (more than a hundred state channels did not), and the colonialist mindset reduces everything in Iran to Israeli policy or international TV.
Moradian replied that Iranians suffer primarily from their own government's politics, within a larger container of sanctions, isolation, punishment, and now military aggression, and that for people in Iran their main enemy is their government, "very obvious if you're there." It is therefore a colonial mindset to dismiss people's genuine grievances. But where people land politically is not a foregone conclusion: Iranians have been through years of different uprisings and idioms of struggle, including a reformist era when people did not call for the regime's overthrow. She was never a reformist and was an outlier then too, "but this is where people are at." She is not there to tell Iranians what to do; in 2022 people took to the streets to transform their own society, calling for neither Pahlavi nor the US, and we need to understand what has happened since to produce the feeling that the monarchy or the war might help. She rejects a politics of identity in which one is "the authentic Iranian" ("my own family members in Iran and I disagree about things"). Her role, she said, is to build forms of international solidarity. And she asked the audience: "Does solidarity matter? Is it a value you care about? Do we need international solidarity anymore, or is it every country for itself?" She does not think the US or Pahlavi will advance Iranians' aspirations, and does not think a majority of Iranians support Pahlavi, just as mass pro-government rallies show only a visible minority.
7.6 Amin on the Pahlavi question
Amin (in Persian) said he is in daily contact with family in Iran and understands part of Barootian's point: a considerable part of Iranians today feel deep nostalgia for the Pahlavi era, after fifty years of the Islamic Republic have brought poverty and desperation, and that era, even if patriarchal, seems "less patriarchal than this." In 1979 Khomeini and the Islamists "hijacked" the revolution and killed agents of the Shah's regime without fair trial, which remains in people's hearts. The left should take this into account and seek some reconciliation. But Pahlavi was unknown fifteen years ago, and his popularity is largely the product of propaganda and media that, particularly since 2022, set out to rebrand him. (The end of his remarks is unintelligible in the recording.)
7.7 A question about the effectiveness of street protests, and the answer
A scholar at the University of Calgary said academics in gender studies and critical race theory have a foot in two worlds, epistemic work and activism, and asked how effective street protests are: in Canada, which already has no political relations with Iran and has imposed sanctions, going to the streets can merely "manufacture consent" for war and more sanctions. How do we distinguish protests that build power for people inside Iran from those that manufacture consent for policies they have little control over? What concrete signs would tell us our activism helps?
Moradian first said the article was hard to publish, repeatedly rejected by journals because it was not "what you're supposed to say," taking about two years. On the streets she said not to fetishize any tactic. Protests can matter because they bring together people who need to find each other and build community: in every feminist organization's story people had to come together, share stories, collaborate, learn from one another, and chart a visible, accessible politics that can draw others. They can also send a message to people in Iran: "We're with you, we see you, we care if you live or die." How many times have people in Iran asked "where is the world?" So solidarity in the street has this double meaning, but it is just one tactic; sometimes streets are unsafe or the political space so right-wing that any intervention is weaponized.
She described her collective's experience: they went to the streets while the movement was very active, on global days of solidarity such as the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, and before the war with "no war, no Islamic Republic, no Shah." Slogans and banners let them argue that liberation comes from below, and to articulate an anti-war position different from the campus left's. In New York the dominant forces were "Make Iran Great Again," pro-Trump, pro-war, monarchist factions, so they formed their own contingent with their own slogans; many Iranians who did not support Trump, Netanyahu, or the Israeli flags, but were horrified by the massacre, found them as "an alternative that wasn't folding that grief into war," recalling the post-9/11 slogan "our grief is not a cry for war." Still, they were very marginalized, and street protest is not their priority now; they have prepared a large report on executions, asking why this is a feminist issue and what a feminist argument against the death penalty is: "epistemic activism," with a more porous relationship between theory and practice, "because nobody has the answer."
As for the risk of being distorted or weaponized, there is no foolproof plan (look at the Guardian letter), but one can make it harder by being as clear as possible about what we are for and against. "But I don't think silence is the answer. I hate the idea that we would say it's just too hard." Except for individuals worried about citizenship or visas, collectively we must see this as a long-term struggle and keep finding ways, on social media or in the street, to offer a different analysis of Iran.
7.8 Mahboobeh's question: regional feminist solidarity and Kurdish feminists
Mahboobeh asked: with the war and what is happening in the Kurdish-populated regions, what lessons can Middle Eastern feminists learn from Kurdish feminists, who for decades have fought colonialism, exploitation, and wars and kept their feminist identity against war and patriarchy? And with the war having intensely securitized the atmosphere, linking any activity to foreign powers and intensifying repression, how much possibility do you see for regional feminist solidarity, the kind (between feminists of Turkey, the Kurdish regions, Lebanon, and Egypt) whose importance we saw after Woman, Life, Freedom?
7.9 Moradian's answer: the Kurdish lesson and Palestine
Moradian said she is not an expert but agrees with the framing: a consistent opposition to more than one source of oppression at once. The Kurdish uprising was one of the first mass democratic resistances to the consolidation of the Islamic Republic, and Kurds have long resisted the violence of the post-colonial state; but there is also a deep, inspiring feminist tradition that resists patriarchy within society, on the basis that freedom becomes possible for everyone through transforming social relations and egalitarianism. It was this Kurdish feminist lesson, she said, that ignited the whole Woman, Life, Freedom movement: that embodied knowledge and political legacy "spread like wildfire" and captured imaginations across the country, part of what makes it a historic breakthrough, not only around gender but for the possibility of breaking ethno-nationalism and thinking of Kurdish liberation as part of what a different Iran would be.
On regional solidarity, small, fledgling meetings are under way to bring together feminists from different locations. What seems more available is feminist solidarity against war and against the US and Israel; the stumbling block is state repression inside Iran. She is writing an article on Palestine and Iran together, since there is no regional feminist solidarity without Palestine, and geopolitics has pitted Iranians and Palestinians against each other in tragic ways. If we cannot rethink that and imagine Palestinian liberation and Iranian liberation going hand in hand, rather than the "axis of resistance" and the like, she said, "that is a big, big problem," and regional feminist solidarity engaged with each country's aspirations for liberation will not be possible.
7.10 Amin's last question: what tangible thing can we do for people inside Iran?
Amin asked what practical, immediate, tangible thing can be done for people inside Iran. A considerable part of why people were drawn toward foreign aggression, he argued, is poverty, desperation, and need for immediate help, while the Islamic Republic not only does not help but makes things worse and foreign forces claim "we came to save you"; people know they lie, yet "feel" that at least some IRGC members were killed, which eases their helplessness a little. The "gray stratum," the middle currents, have offered no alternative; efforts such as feminist networks and global coalitions have begun, but he sees no tangible help yet reaching impoverished, bereaved families and tens of thousands of political prisoners being tortured and executed. We must organize an alternative of "neither the Islamic Republic, nor war, nor Pahlavi."
7.11 Moradian's final answer: campaigns, mutual aid, and building an alternative
Moradian answered that we must campaign against executions and use whatever platforms we have to make prisoners' names household names, so that this campaigning is not something only the right wing does: we must reclaim it as a popular position "not folded into war and sanctions," as part of opposing war and sanctions, forms of violence harming the same people who are sanctioned, bombed, and whose relatives are in prison or facing execution. Beyond "propagandistic" campaigns there is material support, though hard under sanctions: forms of mutual aid, with ways to contribute directly to funds that do not pass through the state. Third is building a political alternative.
"And this is where it's so painful, because the left is so weak": people like us who oppose executions, war, and state repression have been historically defeated for generations. We lack the equivalent of the Lincoln Brigades, working people who went to Spain to fight Franco's fascists side by side with ordinary Spaniards rather than calling on their governments. We have no mass organizations to send our Lincoln Brigades to join the Iranian people, and are reduced to social media campaigns, fundraisers, and education. "But just because we can't stop it doesn't mean it's wrong to try." It is better to agitate and organize in ways people in Iran can see, because it helps to know they are not alone and that people care and are trying to build an alternative. And we need one to the monarchists and the right wing: "I think it's a disaster if the experiences of post-colonial Iran bring back a monarchy. I really do think that's a tragedy. Iranians deserve so much better and have been able to imagine and fight for so much more than that."
Like those who came before us, she said, we must use the space of diaspora or exile, and the freedoms we still have, though increasingly constricted, to write, speak, think, and organize political alternatives meaningful to people in Iran, not by prescribing but by starting from the suffering, crisis, and real conditions on the ground. An example is the dossier she and Aiden Niku published almost a year ago in Jadaliyya, seven essays on the compound crises afflicting Iranian society and the obstacles to freedom, in ways that do not feed a right-wing monarchist conclusion. Her summary: "I think that's what we have to keep doing, as inadequate and feeble and pathetic and unsatisfying as that ultimately is."
Amin closed by thanking Dr. Moradian for giving her time despite exhaustion and the pressures of teaching and activism, and hoped these conversations would help different groups come closer and cooperate in building a future better than today's dark and bitter conditions.